

РОССИЙСКАЯ АКАДЕМИЯ НАУК
ИНСТИТУТ ВОСТОКОВЕДЕНИЯ

ВЕСТНИК

Института востоковедения РАН

2020

3 (13)



Журнал выходит четыре раза в год

Основан в феврале 2018 года

Москва
ИВ РАН

ISSN 2618-7302

Периодическое издание

DOI: 10.31696/2618-7302-2020-3

**Рецензируемый научный журнал Института востоковедения РАН
Учрежден Ученым советом Института востоковедения РАН
Зарегистрирован в Национальном агентстве ISSN Российской Федерации**

Главный редактор

Научный руководитель Института востоковедения РАН, академик РАН
В. В. Наумкин

Редакционная коллегия

В. П. Андросов	И. Д. Звягельская
А. В. Акимов	Т. А. Карасова
Л. Б. Алаев	Е. А. Катасонова
Ю. Г. Александров	А. И. Кобзев
А. К. Аликберов	В. А. Кузнецов
В. М. Алпатов	Ю. В. Любимов
С. Э. Бабкин	Н. М. Мамедова
А. Г. Белова	Д. В. Микульский
В. Я. Белокреницкий	Д. В. Мосяков
С. А. Бурлак	В. Н. Настич
Е. Ю. Ванина	К. В. Орлова
Д. Д. Васильев	С. А. Панарин
А. В. Воронцов	Н. И. Пригарина
А. В. Демченко	Н. Г. Романова (<i>зам. гл. редактора</i>)
А. С. Десницкий	А. В. Сарабьев
А. Ю. Другов	В. Н. Саутов
А. С. Железняков	З. М. Шаляпина
А. О. Захаров	Т. А. Шаумян

Редакция

Д. В. Дубровская (*ответственный секретарь*)
С. Е. Малых (*научный редактор*)

E-mail: vestnikivran@yandex.ru

ФГБУН Институт востоковедения Российской академии наук
107031, Москва, ул. Рождественка, 12, комн. 251

Дизайн обложки – С. В. Ветхов; макет и верстка – С. Е. Малых

На обложке: Горы Манден и деревня Сиби округа Кати,
Мали, январь 2020 г. (*фото П. А. Куценкова*)

**RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES**

JOURNAL
of the
Institute of Oriental Studies RAS

2020

3 (13)



Published quarterly

Founded in February, 2018

**Moscow
IOS RAS**

Peer-reviewed journal of the Institute of Oriental Studies RAS

The journal was founded by the Academic Council of the Institute of Oriental Studies,
Russian Academy of Sciences

Registered in the ISSN National Agency of the Russian Federation

Editor-in-Chief

Academic Supervisor of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences
Vitaly V. Naumkin

Editorial Board

V. P. Androsov	N. M. Mamedova
A. V. Akimov	D. V. Mikulskiy
L. B. Alaev	D. V. Mosyakov
Y. G. Aleksandrov	V. N. Nastich
A. K. Alikberov	K. V. Orlova
V. M. Alpatov	S. A. Panarin
S. E. Babkin	N. I. Prigarina
V. Y. Belokrenitsky	N. G. Romanova (<i>deputy ed.-in-chief</i>)
A. G. Belova	A. V. Sarabyev
S. A. Burlak	V. N. Sautov
A. V. Demchenko	Z. M. Shalyapina
A. S. Desnitskiy	T. L. Shaumyan
A. Y. Drugov	E. Y. Vanina
T. A. Karasova	D. D. Vasilyev
E. L. Katasonova	A. V. Vorontsov
A. I. Kobzev	A. O. Zakharov
V. A. Kuznetsov	A. S. Zheleznyakov
Y. V. Lyubimov	I. D. Zvyagelskaya

Editorial Group

Dinara V. Dubrovskaya (*Executive Editor*)
Svetlana E. Malykh (*Scholarly Editor*)

Вестник Института востоковедения РАН. № 3 (13). — М.: ИВ РАН, 2020. — 360 с.

ISSN 2618-7302

DOI: 10.31696/2618-7302-2020-3

Мнения авторов могут не совпадать с точкой зрения Института востоковедения РАН,
редколлегии и редакции журнала.

Редакция не несет ответственности за точность и достоверность сведений, приводимых
авторами.

E-mail: vestnikivran@yandex.ru

Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences
bld. 12, Rozhdestvenka st., Moscow, Russia, 107031, room 251

© ФГБУН ИВ РАН, 2020

© Редакция журнала «Вестник Института
востоковедения РАН» (составитель), 2020

СОДЕРЖАНИЕ

От редакции 11

ИСТОРИЧЕСКИЕ НАУКИ И АРХЕОЛОГИЯ

ПОЛЕВЫЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ

Ванюкова Д. В., Куценков П. А. Экспедиция в Мали в 2020 г. 12

ДИСКУССИЯ

Драч Г. В., Кириллов А. А. Проблематика истории Востока и современность: размышления о книге Л. Б. Алаева 29

ЕГИПТОЛОГИЯ

Орехов Р. А. Роль царя Пепи I в становлении будущей столицы египетского государства — Мемфиса 40

ДРЕВНИЙ НЕКРОПОЛЬ ГИЗЫ: СТРАНИЦЫ ПОЗДНЕЙ ИСТОРИИ

Гончаров Е. Ю., Малых С. Е. Исламские монеты из Восточной Гизы (Египет) 57

Лебедев М. А. Дж. Б. Кавилья и начало археологического изучения скальных гробниц восточной окраины Гизы 63

Малых С. Е. Керамические трубки-оттоманки из Гизы: к истории табакокурения на Востоке 77

ТЮРКСКИЙ МИР ВЧЕРА И СЕГОДНЯ

Тишин В. В. К имени «короля тюрков» в «Хронике Фредегара» 90

Тимохин Д. М. Описание судьбы городов Хорасана и Мавераннахра в годы монгольского нашествия в арабо-персидских географических сочинениях 100

Сибгатуллина А. Т. Турецкий контингент в Коммунистическом университете трудящихся Востока. Часть I 113

ВОСТОЧНАЯ МЕНТАЛЬНОСТЬ

Герасимова М. П. Макото — исходный принцип этических и эстетических убеждений японцев 126

Грачёв М. В. Ритуал «тякуда-но мацуригото» в японской судебной системе эпохи Хэйан 139

Ванина Е. Ю. Чужеземная прислуга в индийском княжестве Бхопал (XIX — начало XX вв.) 151

ORIENT ET OCCIDENT

Дубровская Д. В. Английские денсты и «шараваджизм»: от интеллектуального ландшафта к ландшафтному парку 164

Никольская К. Д. У истоков европейской индологии: письмо Бартоломеуса Цигенбальга об Индии 171

Молодяков В. Э. «Письма юнги Жана» — источник по истории Тайваня во время франко-китайской войны 1884–1885 гг. 181

Сидорова С. Е. Ост-Индские и другие доки в Лондоне: имперская архитектура, колониальная торговля и постколониальная память 190

ИЗ ИСТОРИИ ОТЕЧЕСТВЕННОГО ВОСТОКОВЕДЕНИЯ	
<i>Федорченко А. В., Масюкова И. В.</i> Израилеведение в Институте востоковедения РАН: страницы истории (конец 1950-х — 1990-е гг.)	206
ФАЛЕРИСТИКА ВОСТОКА	
<i>Захаров А. О.</i> Священная звезда — военный орден Индонезии	217
ПЕРЕВОДЫ И КОММЕНТАРИИ	
<i>Полхов С. А.</i> О:та Гю:ити. «Записи о князе Нобунага». Свиток IX (перевод и комментарий)	229
<i>Бочковская А. В.</i> Балбир Мадхонури. С чистого листа: зарубки в детской памяти (глава из автобиографии «Обрубленное дерево»)	249
ИСТОРИЧЕСКИЕ И ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ НАУКИ	
ПОЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ КОНФЛИКТОЛОГИЯ	
<i>Ахмедов В. М.</i> Сирийский кризис: история и современная политическая ситуация	265
<i>Дербенев А. С.</i> Саудовская Аравия в жерновах политической турбулентности	273
<i>Носенко Т. В.</i> Израильская историография о советской политике в ближневосточных войнах	286
ЭКОНОМИКА И ПОЛИТИКА СТРАН АЗИИ И АФРИКИ В XXI ВЕКЕ	
<i>Авдаков И. Ю.</i> Транспорт Японии в океане экономических и природных потрясений	298
<i>Бизяев А. И., Марьясис Д. А.</i> К вопросу о влиянии пандемии COVID-19 на социально-экономическое развитие Израиля	304
ФИЛОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ НАУКИ	
LINGVAE ORIENTALES	
<i>Погибенко Т. Г.</i> Никобарские языки и древнекхмерский: формы зависимой предикации	317
<i>Воронина Л. А.</i> Комиксы как источник экстралингвистической информации, необходимой для формирования фоновых знаний у русскоязычных студентов при обучении их корейскому языку	333
<i>Шеремет В. В.</i> О некоторых особенностях передачи экспериментивно-автореперентного состояния в арабском языке (на корпусном материале)	345
НАУЧНАЯ ЖИЗНЬ	
IN MEMORIAM	
<i>Алаев А. Б.</i> Вспоминая щедрого человека. Памяти Анатолия Акимовича Куценкова (14.01.1929–01.08.2020)	354
<i>Кузнецова-Фетисова М. Е.</i> Памяти Станислава Иосифовича (Роберта) Кучеры (05.05.1928–28.07.2020)	357

CONTENTS

Editorial	11
HISTORICAL STUDIES AND ARCHAEOLOGY	
FIELD STUDIES	
<i>Vaniukova D. V., Kutsenkov P. A.</i> Expedition to Mali, 2020	12
DISCUSSION	
<i>Drach G. V., Kirillov A. A.</i> Problems of the Oriental History and Modernity: Reflections on Leonid B. Alaev's Book	29
EGYPTOLOGY	
<i>Orekhov R. A.</i> King Pepi's Role in Forming Memphis, the Future Capital of Egypt	40
ANCIENT NECROPOLIS OF GIZA: PAGES OF LATE HISTORY	
<i>Goncharov E. Yu., Malykh S. E.</i> Islamic Coins from Eastern Giza (Egypt)	57
<i>Lebedev M. A.</i> G. B. Caviglia and the Beginning of the Archaeological Study of Rock-Cut Tombs of the Eastern Escarpment of Giza	63
<i>Malykh S. E.</i> Ceramic Pipes-Ottomans from Giza: On the History of Tobacco Smoking in the Orient	77
TURKIC WORLD YESTERDAY AND TODAY	
<i>Tishin V. V.</i> To the Name of the "King of Türks" in the Chronicle of Fredegar	90
<i>Timokhin D. M.</i> Description of Khorasan and Transoxiana Cities' Lot during the Mongol Invasion in the Arab-Persian Geographical Texts	100
<i>Sibgatullina A. T.</i> Turkish Contingent at the Communist University of Workers of the East. Part I	113
ORIENTAL MENTALITY	
<i>Gerasimova M. P.</i> Makoto as the Initial Principle of the Ethical and Aesthetic Beliefs of the Japanese	126
<i>Grachyov M. V.</i> The Chakuda no Matsurigoto Ritual of Heian Japan Judiciary	139
<i>Vanina E. Yu.</i> Foreigner Servants in an Indian Princely State Bhopal (19 th — Early 20 th Centuries)	151
ORIENT ET OCCIDENT	
<i>Dubrovskaya D. V.</i> British Deists and "Sharavadvism": From Intellectual Landscape to the Landscape Park	164
<i>Nikolskaia X. D.</i> The Origins of European Indology: Bartholomeus Ziegenbalg's Letter on India	171
<i>Molodiakov V. E.</i> "Letters of Sea Cadet Jean" As a Source on Taiwan History during Sino-French War of 1884–1885	181
<i>Sidorova S. E.</i> East Indian and Other Docks in London: Imperial Architecture, Colonial Trade and Postcolonial Memory	190

FROM THE HISTORY OF RUSSIAN ORIENTAL STUDIES	
<i>Fedorchenko A. V., Masyukova I. V.</i> Israeli Studies in the Institute of Oriental Studies RAS: Pages of History (from the End of 1950's till the 1990's)	206
PHALERISTICA ORIENTALIA	
<i>Zakharov A. O.</i> The Military Award of Indonesia Bintang Sakti — The Sacred Star	217
TRANSLATIONS AND COMMENTARIES	
<i>Polkbov S. A.</i> Ōta Gyuichi. «Shincho-ko ki», Book IX (Commented Translation into Russian)	229
<i>Bochkovskaya A. V.</i> Balbir Madhopuri. Kore kāgaz kī gahrī likhat / Inscriptions on a Tender Mind (A Chapter from Chāṅgiā rukh / Against the Night)	249
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL STUDIES	
POLITICAL CONFLICT STUDIES	
<i>Akhmedov V. M.</i> The Syrian Crisis: History and Current Politics	265
<i>Derbenev A. S.</i> Saudi Arabia at the Top of Political Turbulence	273
<i>Nosenko T. V.</i> Israeli Historiography on Soviet Politics in the Middle Eastern Wars	286
ECONOMY AND POLITICS OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY	
<i>Avdakov I. Yu.</i> Japanese Transport in the Ocean of Economic and Natural Shocks	298
<i>Bizyaev A. I., Maryasis D. A.</i> On the Issue of COVID-19 Influence on the Israeli Socio-Economic Development	304
PHILOLOGICAL STUDIES	
LINGVAE ORIENTALES	
<i>Pogibenko T. G.</i> Nicobarese languages and Old Khmer: forms of dependent predication	317
<i>Voronina L. A.</i> Manhwa as a Source of the Extralinguistic Information for Background Knowledge Formation while Teaching Korean to Russian-Speaking Students	333
<i>Sheremet V. V.</i> On Some Features of Transmission of Experientive Self-Reference State in the Arabic Language (On the Base of Corpora Material)	345
ACADEMIC EVENTS	
IN MEMORIAM	
<i>Alaev L. B.</i> Remembering a Generous Man. In Memoriam Anatoly A. Kutsenkov (January 14, 1929 — August 01, 2020)	354
<i>Kuznetsova-Fetisova M. E.</i> To the Memory of Stanislav I. (Robert) Kuczera (May 05, 1928 — July 28, 2020)	357

DOI: 10.31696/2618-7302-2020-3-265-272

SYRIAN CRISIS: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLITICS

© 2020

Vladimir M. Akhmedov*

The article studies main developments, implications and results of the 10 year Syrian crisis. The author pays special attention to the historical preconditions that caused those events in Syria, focusing on actual political, social, economic, ethnic, ideological, regional, and international dimensions of the Syrian crisis based on historical background. The author tries to make some forecasts about further development of the current situation in Syria in view of abilities to peacefully resolve the conflict by political instruments rather than military options. The publication tends to study new tendencies in the Syrian crisis development. The author argues that today the Syrian conflict is developing in a different paradigm that can be tentatively designated as the “post-terrorist” stage in the Syrian uprising. Main attention is paid to Russia’s politics in Syria and its ability to rebuild the main institutions of the Syrian state. Political steps and tendencies of major regional and international players in the Syrian crisis are analysed. In this regard the author supposes and demonstrates in this article that much depends on how Russia, Turkey, Iran, the United States and Israel change the previous agreements on the security system in Syria. The author believes that despite all the complexity of this crisis, peace in Syria is quite possible. A lot depends on political will and the readiness for mutual compromises between key internal and external actors in the Syrian crisis.

Keywords: Syrian Crisis, Arab Spring, Russia in Syrian Crisis, USA in the Middle East, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Middle East, international affairs, Syrian opposition, Islamists.

For citation: Akhmedov V. M. The Syrian Crisis: History and Current Politics. *Vestnik Instituta vostokovedenija RAN*. 2020. 3. Pp. 265–272. DOI: 10.31696/2618-7302-2020-3-265-272

СИРИЙСКИЙ КРИЗИС: ИСТОРИЯ И СОВРЕМЕННАЯ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ СИТУАЦИЯ

В. М. АХМЕДОВ

В статье исследуются основные события, последствия и результаты 10-летнего сирийского кризиса. Автор обращает особое внимание на исторические предпосылки, вызвавшие эти события в Сирии, уделяя особое внимание актуальным политическим, социальным, экономическим, этническим, идеологическим, региональным и международным измерениям сирийского кризиса, основанным на историческом контексте. Автор полагает, что в результате гражданской войны в Сирии основные институты государства и общественные организации серьезно ослабли, а их роль в процессе восстановления страны заметно снизилась. В этой связи автор считает, что основные государственные институты страны нуждаются в серьезном реформировании. Автор пытается делать некоторые прогнозы относительно

* Vladimir M. AKHMEDOV, PhD (History), Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Oriental Studies RAS, Moscow; shamyarabist@gmail.com

Владимир Муртузович АХМЕДОВ, кандидат исторических наук, старший научный сотрудник Института востоковедения РАН, Москва; shamyarabist@gmail.com

ORCID ID: 0000-0002-4952-2964

дальнейшего развития нынешней ситуации в Сирии с учетом возможностей мирного урегулирования конфликта политическими, а не военными инструментами, стремясь принять во внимание новые тенденции в развитии сирийского кризиса. Автор утверждает, что сегодня сирийский конфликт развивается в иной парадигме, которую можно условно обозначить как «посттеррористический» этап сирийского восстания. Большое внимание уделяется политике и действиям основных региональных и международных игроков в сирийском кризисе. Автор отмечает ключевую роль России в урегулировании сирийского кризиса и предпринимаемые нашей страной усилия по восстановлению основных институтов сирийского государства. Автор считает, что, несмотря на всю сложность этого кризиса, мир в Сирии вполне возможен. Многое зависит от политической воли и готовности к взаимным компромиссам между ключевыми внутренними и внешними участниками на поле сирийского кризиса.

Ключевые слова: Сирийский кризис, Арабская весна, политика России в Сирии, политика США на Ближнем Востоке, Иран, Турция, Саудовская Аравия, Ближний Восток, международные отношения, сирийская оппозиция, исламисты.

Для цитирования: Ахмедов В. М. Сирийский кризис: история и современная политическая ситуация. *Вестник Института востоковедения РАН*. 2020. № 3. С. 265–272. DOI: 10.31696/2618-7302-2020-3-265-272

The 10-year armed conflict in Syria is one of the major issues shaping the contemporary Middle East and influencing the fundamental nature of international relations. The Syrian revolution, which began in March, 2011, later degenerated into a bloody civil war that has pushed the country into both a secessionist upheaval and the breakdown of the population's national identity. Both the duration and complexity of reconciling the Syrian crisis has relayed on a sequence of fundamental factors¹.

Syria's former political system and its institutions [Perthes, 2001, p. 143–154; Seal, 1988, p. 420–440] have been practically annihilated, and the country's new environment has rendered them incapable of having an impact on the conflict without foreign assistance [Quilliam, 1999, p. 27–60]. The distinctive feature of the previous political model in Syria was its institutionalized authoritarianism and strong security environment [Akhmedov, 2010, p. 29–49]. Indeed, civilian-military relations in the Syrian Arab Republic during the last 40 years were mainly dictated by the military's priorities in the framework of the country's key internal and foreign policies [Hinnebusch, 1993, p. 243–257; Zisser, 2001, p. 5–8]. It goes without saying that control during the current crisis has been transferred into the hands of the armed forces, which in effect means the intelligence services [Ziadeh, 2013, p. 143–170]. In this regard it would be only logical to attribute special attention to the behavioural patterns of various governmental institutions [Seale, 1988, p. 552].

The behavioural patterns of various governmental institutions in the framework of a well-structured and vertically-integrated political model were driven by directives prescribed from above — insurgent protests were the direct result of enemy plots against Syria [Alan, 2003, p. 8, 40–87; Wedeen, 1999; Van Dam, 1981]. The radicalization of Syria's conflict and its mutation into an inter-religious struggle was sustained by the actual regime. The first and hardest blow was delivered to the secular and democratic forces [Armed Forces in the Middle East, 2002, p. 1–23].

¹ For more details see: Akhmedov V. *Syrian Crisis. Special Report*. 10.04.2019. URL: <https://doc-research.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/DOC-expert-speaks-at-a-roundtable-on-Syria.pdf> (accessed 02.09.2020).

In a context of asymmetric warfare, where the regime was using air strikes and artillery to bombard occupied neighbourhoods, and where the resistance was badly in need of additional arms and ammunition, suicide bombers became the only viable means of offsetting the government's forces on the battlefield. Relying on this type of attack intensified the deployment of Jihadi brigades among the armed resistance, and led to their initial popularity in the liberated neighbourhoods (for more about Syrian military opposition see: [Ахмедов, 2015, с. 52–57]). Bashar Assad's enlistment of Lebanese, Iraqi, and Iranian mercenaries, which was prompted by the high level of losses among the national military, as well as the lack of combat experience among the newly-recruited soldiers, legitimized the involvement of jihadists from other Arab countries in the eyes of some². In order to remedy the situation, in 2013 the regime began training new armed troops based on militia formations³.

Towards the end of 2015, the number of such formations represented, according to various assessments, some 35,000 to 40,000 soldiers⁴. It was only after the appearance of Russian air force (RAF) that the situation began improving. In 2015, under the leadership of Russian and Iranian consultants, the regime began to create its fourth and fifth army corps, which integrated the above mentioned units⁵.

Two particularities that render the Syrian conflict difficult to resolve were its internationalization and unprecedented duration. The makeup of the Syrian uprising can also be categorized by the traditional distinction between the country's urban and rural environments, as well as the role of the uprising in the outlying regions (at least during its early stages) [Dusen, 1972]. It is well-known that the provincial centres were the breeding grounds of the revolution. This can be explained by the fact that the army and the security forces originally lost their influence among the population exactly in those centres. Also important was the sudden socio-economic deterioration among the population in the periphery due to several years of dry spells, as well as the crippling drought of 2010. Consequently, some 1 million bankrupted farmers and unemployed villagers began moving to Syria's major population centres right before the uprising⁶. As a result, the population in these areas was the most receptive to radical initiatives. The role of moderate Islam began to fade, and the population began to perceive the government's extreme policies and ideology in a negative light. This situation proved most fertile for the outbreak of Islamism, and the measures that were adopted by the government in response to the uprising only strengthened its appeal. Such an environment among the population served as the perfect matrix for the proliferation of jihadist ideas, whether they were bred locally or imported from abroad.

² Lister C., Nelson D. All the President's Militias: Assad's Militiafication of Syria. *Middle East Institute*. 14.12.2017. URL: <http://www.mei.edu/content/article/all-president-s-militias-assad-s-militiafication-syria> (дата обращения: 27.03.2018).

³ *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 2015. 38.5. P. 626–649. Published online: 04.08.2015. <https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fjss20/38/5?nav=toCList> (accessed 01.09.2020).

⁴ Syria Deeply, Analysis: The Fifth Corps and the State of the Syrian Army. *Newsdeeply*. 11.01.2017. URL: <https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/articles/2017/01/11/analysis-the-fifth-corps-and-the-state-of-the-syrian-army> (accessed 01.09.2020).

⁵ Ахмедов В. Кто воюет в Сирии? *Институт Ближнего Востока*. 2014. URL: <http://www.iimes.ru/?p=20322#more-20322> (дата обращения 01.09.2020).

⁶ The data was received by the author during personal discussions with various representatives from the Syrian opposition from 2011 to 2017.

As a result, the Syrian nationalist movement, inspired by the “Arab Spring”, took on some radical religious traits, and its secular composition practically vanished. Once the Syrian uprising at the end of 2011 began to transform into an armed struggle, the position of the armed opposition, including Islamic militants, began solidifying.

By the end of 2016, the number of Islamite units had shrunk substantially. Some were totally annihilated in combat, while others dissolved on their own and ceased to exist as independent combat units. Others were assimilated by greater forces such as the Islamic State, Jaysh al-Islam, Jaysh Fath ash-Sham, Ahrar ash-Sham, Sukur ash-Sham, Feilakh ash Sham, the FSA, and others. New regiments surfaced in early 2015–2016, which essentially comprised former joint military headquarters and units, including Jaysh an-Nasr (a division of the Free Syrian Army), which consists of Jabhat al-Shamayah, Jaysh al-Izza, the Falcons of al-Ghab, and 13 more units, as well as the New Syrian Army (essentially based on Kurdish resistance units), and others. Due to the brittle situation on the Syrian front and the fast-changing political discourse regarding the country, it is rather difficult to determine the exact number of armed units representing the Syrian opposition. However, most experts believed that there were some 100–120 active armed opposition units in Syria (including ISIS and al-Nusra) that comprise no less than 70,000 professional and heavily armed soldiers [Itani, 2014, p. 3–5]⁷. Notwithstanding the opposition’s transformation of its social matrix, ideological concept, political orientation, and major goals and challenges, it must be noted that it has practically remained unaffected with regard to its key parameters from the time of its formation in the first half of 2012.

The backbone of many of the Islamic armed opposition units consists of Salafis, and a good part of them remain faithful (to varying degrees) to the jihadist ideology. The most evident jihadist group is Jabhat an-Nusra. Most of these formations supported the creation of an Islamic State based on Sharia law in Syria.

The Islamist component of the Syrian uprising has undergone a major transformation in recent years, especially with regard to the unique makeup of the Syrian revolution. The possibility that the Islamist phenomena might fade away with the cessation of hostilities and the country’s return to peace cannot be excluded since its motivation is the civil war⁸.

Today’s power struggle between the regime and its armed forces on the one hand, and its political opposition and local armed resistance on the other hand, have led to intense competition among world leaders and regional players for authority in Syria and the broader Arab world.

A salient example of the above-noted tendency is the role of Iran in Syria’s armed conflict. Iran has played a major role in preserving the current Syrian regime.

Iran has created its own Syrian army, Djeish Tahrir al-Sham, which numbered up to 5,000 soldiers and essentially consisted of Shiite mercenaries from Iran and Afghanistan, some Arab countries, and a small number of Syrians. According to data from the Syrian opposition, there were some 60–62 Shiite militia combat formations operating in the country. Typically, those opposing the Free Syrian Army (FSA) consisted of deserted soldiers and officers, militia detachments, and numbered no more than 30,000–35,000 soldiers. The lacking provision of

⁷ Political Source to Rai al-Youm: Expected Meeting between Mohammed Alloush, Russian Diplomats. *Rai al-Youm*. URL: <http://www.raialyoum.com/?p=466451> (accessed 01.09.2020).

⁸ For more information on the role of Muslim Brotherhood in Syrian Uprising see: Lund A. Struggling to Adapt: The Muslim Brotherhood in a New Syria. *Carnegie Endowment*. URL: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Brief_Lund-Syrian_MB.pdf (accessed 01.09.2020).

arms and ammunition from their western allies (principally the United States, Great Britain, and France) has made it extremely difficult to confront even the regime's substantially weakened army, not to mention the Lebanese, Iranian, Iraqi and Afghan Shiite armed units. Indeed, the FSA would have had great difficulty withstanding Syrian government forces without the support of the so-called Islamist armed opposition⁹, which in 2013–2015 fluctuated between 70,000 and 80,000 fighters¹⁰.

Notwithstanding such massive support from Iran, Assad's position at the end of the summer of 2015 was greatly weakened. According to data from the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic, in the summer of 2015 the Syrian President controlled merely 14.5 % of his territory¹¹. Many of Iran's actual foreign policies, including those regarding Syria, were designed in accordance with its own internal security concerns, and prioritized by its strong desire to reach the status of a nuclear power similar to Israel and Pakistan.¹²

This leads us to believe that Iran could perceive Syria as a trump card in a wider geopolitical game. At the same time, however, we should not overlook Iran's interests in Syria, which Tehran has considered a major foothold for the expansion of its authority in the region¹³.

The conflict in Syria and its surroundings changed radically with the involvement of Russia's Aerospace Forces (RAF). In less than a year, the territory under Syria's control grew to 35–40 % of the country's territory.¹⁴ Moscow became a key partner in the Syrian conflict, a situation that the US, Europe, Turkey, Israel and neighbouring countries have been forced to acknowledge.

The liberation of Aleppo — the stronghold of Syria's armed opposition — was the result of Russia's armed involvement in the Syrian conflict from the fall of 2015.

From the end of 2017 — the beginning of 2019 the situation in the sphere of armed confrontation in Syria and around it has changed dramatically. The ongoing hostilities were notable for the unpredictability of the finale and could have pushed a new process in the development of the Syrian crisis.

The Syrian conflict has been developing in a different paradigm. Conventionally, it can be designated as the "post-terrorist" stage in the Syrian uprising. After the decisive victory over terrorism in the face of ISIS, a new situation began to emerge in the country. However,

⁹ For more information about the special role of the salafiyun in the Syrian Uprising see: [Abdurrahman al-Haj, 2013, p. 11–12, 16–18, 27–39].

¹⁰ From the unpublished correspondence of the author.

¹¹ This data was publically voiced by the representative of the Centre in various Russian media in January–February 2017.

¹² Some experts consider that Iran, experiencing at this time a lack of force ability to gain a victory over Syrian military opposition, has played a significant role in Moscow taken decision to involved military in Syrian conflict on the fall 2015.

¹³ For more about the role of Iran see: Clawson P. Iran's Vulnerabilities to U.S. Sanctions (Part 1): Finding the Weak Spots. *The Washington Institute*. URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-vulnerabilities-to-u.s.-sanctions-part-1-finding-the-weak-spots> (accessed 01.09.2020); Mansharof Y. Despite denials by Iranian regime, statements by Majlis member and reports in Iran indicate involvement of Iranian troops in Syria fighting. *The Middle East Media Research Institute*. URL: <https://www.memri.org/reports/despitedenials-iranian-regime-statements-majlis-member-and-reports-iran-indicate> (accessed 02.09.2020).

¹⁴ The data was substantiated during the author's personal discussions with various representatives of the Syrian opposition in February–March, 2017.

there is still “the notorious Tahrir ash-Sham”. At the same time, in a number of key areas of the country — the suburbs of Idlib and Aleppo — this terrorist structure was gradually losing its former leading position and social base of support¹⁵. It definitely influenced the mindset of the main participants in the conflict and determined their behavioral stereotype.

On the other hand, after the victory over ISIS, Russia and the United States have become not so much allies in the fight against terrorism, as rivals in the struggle for Syria.

Since the beginning of 2020, a number of important and sudden changes have occurred in the development of the Syrian crisis. First of all, they were determined by the growth of the armed confrontation of the opposing sides. A number of major regional and international players actively involved in this process, who were very likely to use force to change the existing balance of power and realize their interests at the stage of political settlement.

In the current situation, it is hardly possible to talk about the absolute dominance of any of the parties to the conflict in the matter of completely reformatting the local military-political infrastructure in accordance with their own national strategy.

In 2020 Russia has managed to almost completely eliminate the concept of “areas under opposition’s control” from the plans of the armed opposition. The returns a significant part of the Syrian territory under the control of the Syrian government virtually exclude from the negotiating agenda on Syria the issue of Bashar Assad [Akhmedov, 2018a, p. 136–140]¹⁶.

At the same time, Moscow, according to the Syrian opposition and leakages from the ranks of the SAA, began to actively introduce its loyalist’s Syrian personnel and the Syrian military trained in Russia into the most efficient units of the Syrian army and security forces. This gives Russia the ability to actually control their activities, and in some cases, manage them.

In fact, the issue of developing new security parameters, within which Moscow could legally establish its primacy and achievements in Syria, is currently the key one¹⁷.

Indeed, today much depends on how Russia, Turkey and Iran, the United States and Israel will change the previous agreements on the security system in Syria. As is known, this is happening against the background of the aggravation of the situation in the country, which further complicates the task.

The Syrian crisis brought new social forces to the political foreground, split the outwardly unified Syrian society, and influenced the change in the confessional map of the country, which undoubtedly will affect the course of future political processes in Syria. The

¹⁵ Djabhat An-Nusra Tafkadu Hadinatiha Ash-Sha’abiya Fi Ibleb Wa Intilak Al-A’ad Al-Aksyi Li-t-Tafakkuk. *Elnashra*. URL: <https://www.elnashra.com/news/show/118521/> (accessed 01.09.2020); Leader in Levant Liberation [Committee] to Quds Arabi: We will fight Zenki Movement that wants to eliminate us... *Al-Quds al-Arabi (UK)*. 23.02.18. URL: <https://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=88547/> (accessed 01.09.2020).

¹⁶ Lund A. Showdown in East Ghouta. *Carnegie Middle East Center*. 04.08.2016. URL: <http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/63512?lang=en> (accessed 01.09.2020).

¹⁷ See more about allegedly initiated by Russia massive reshuffles in the Syrian secret services and army in: An-Nahas S. Al-Mamluk wa Kadat Al-Istihbarat Al-Judud: Russiya Tanal Hissat Al-Assad. *Almodonline*. 08.07.2019. URL: <https://bit.ly/2JpNnfM> (accessed 12.08.2019); Al-Tamimi J. A. Administrative Decisions on Local Defense Forces Personnel: Translation & Analysis. *Pundicity*. 03.05.2017. URL: <https://goo.gl/ngXYKc> (accessed 01.09.2020); Al-Tamimi J. A. The Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham-al-Qaeda Dispute: Primary Texts (VIII). *Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi blog*. 03.02.2019. URL: <http://www.aymennjawad.org/2019/02/the-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-al-qaeda-dispute-primary-7> (accessed 01.09.2020).

acute issues of the organization of the transition period and the formation of government institutions with new contents, of course, should be solved by the Syrians themselves through a large social contract under which the parties are able to make very serious compromises and take on serious guarantee obligations. An important role in the completion of the military phase of the conflict and the stage of political transition belongs to the national armed forces.

In the current situation it is hardly possible to talk about the absolute dominance of any of the parties to the conflict in the matter of the complete reformatting the local military-political infrastructure in accordance with their own national strategy. This situation forces the main parties to the conflict to change their previous approaches to the problem of holding their positions in the context of rapidly changing local realities and the new role of their partners and opponents in the field of Syrian resolution.

References / Литература

- АХМЕДОВ В. М. Восточная Гута — переломная точка в Сирийской войне. *Вестник Института востоковедения РАН*. 2018а. № 1. С. 135–140 [Akhmedov V. M. Eastern Ghouta — A Turning Point in the Syrian War. *Vestnik Instituta vostokovedenija RAN*. 2018а. 1. Pp. 135–140 (in Russian)].
- АХМЕДОВ В. М. *Роль исламского фактора в общественно-политическом развитии стран Ближнего Востока и его эволюция в условиях сирийского восстания (90-е гг. — начало XXI в.)*. М., 2015 [Akhmedov V. M. *Islamic Factor in the Development of Society and Politics of the Middle Eastern Arabian Countries and Its Evolution during the Syrian Revolt (From the 90th till the Beginning of the 21st Century)*. Moscow, 2015 (in Russian)].
- АХМЕДОВ В. М. *Сирийское восстание: история, политика, идеология*. М., 2018 [Akhmedov V. M. *Syrian Uprising: History, Politics, Ideology*. Moscow, 2018 (in Russian)].
- АХМЕДОВ В. М. *Современная Сирия. История. Политика. Экономика*. 2-е изд. М., 2010 [Akhmedov V. M. *Modern Syria. History. Politics. Economics*. 2nd ed. Moscow, 2010 (in Russian)].
- Abdurrahman al-Haj. Al-Salafiyah wa Salafiyun fi Soria: min al-Islah ila al-Jihad. *Al-Jazeera Special Report*. 20 May 2013 [Abdurrahman al-Haj. Salafiya and salafists in Syria: from al-Islam to al-Jihad. *Al-Jazeera Special Report*. 20 May 2013 (in Arabic)].
- Alan G. *Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom*. London, New York, 2003.
- Armed Forces in the Middle East. Politics and Strategy*. Rubin B., Keaney Th. A. (Eds.). London, Portland, 2002.
- Dusen Van M. Political Integration and Regionalism in Syria. *The Middle East Journal*. 1972. No. 2. Pp. 23–56.
- Itani F. Losing Syria and Iraq to Jihadists. Atlantic Council of the United States. Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Issue in Focus. June 27, 2014.
- Hinnebush R. A. State and Civil Society in Syria. *Middle East Journal*. Vol. 47. 1993. 2. Pp. 243–257.
- Voelker Perthes. The Political Economy of the Syrian Succession. *Survival*. 2001. 43.1. Pp. 143–154.
- Seale P. *Asad of Syria. The Struggle for the Middle East*. London, 1988.
- Quilliam N. *Syria and the New World Order*. London, 1999.
- Van Dam N. *The Struggle for Power in Syria. Sectarianism, Regionalism and Tribalism in Politics, 1961–1980*. London, 1981.
- Wedeen L. *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric and Symbols in Contemporary Syria*. Chicago, 1999.
- Ziadeh R. *As-Sulta wa-l-Istihbarat fi Syria*. Beirut, 2013.
- Zisser E. The Syrian Army: Between the Domestic and the External Fronts. *Middle East Review of International Affairs*. 2001. 5.1. Pp. 1–12.

Electronic sources / Электронные ресурсы

- АХМЕДОВ В. Кто воюет в Сирии? *Институт Ближнего Востока*. 2014. URL: <http://www.iimes.ru/?p=20322#more-20322> (дата обращения 01.09.2020).
- Akhmedov V. *Syrian Crisis. Special Report*. 10.04.2019. URL: <https://doc-research.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/DOC-expert-speaks-at-a-roundtable-on-Syria.pdf> (accessed 02.09.2020).
- Al-Tamimi J. A. Administrative Decisions on Local Defense Forces Personnel: Translation & Analysis. *Pundicity*. 03.05.2017. URL: <https://goo.gl/ngXYKc> (accessed 01.09.2020).
- Al-Tamimi J. A. The Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham-al-Qaeda Dispute: Primary Texts (VIII). *Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi blog*. 03.02.2019. URL: <http://www.aymennjawad.org/2019/02/the-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-al-qaeda-dispute-primary-7> (accessed 01.09.2020).
- An-Nahas S. Al-Mamluk wa Kadat Al-Istihbarat Al-Judud: Russiya Tanal Hissat Al-Assad. *Almodonline*. 08.07.2019. URL: <https://bit.ly/2JpNnfM> (accessed 12.08.2019).
- Clawson P. Iran's Vulnerabilities to U.S. Sanctions (Part 1): Finding the Weak Spots. *The Washington Institute*. URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-vulnerabilities-to-u.s.-sanctions-part-1-finding-the-weak-spots> (accessed 01.09.2020).
- Djabhat An-Nusra Tafkadu Hadinatiha Ash-Sha'abiya Fi Ibleb Wa Intilak Al-A'ad Al-Aksyi Li-t-Tafakkuk. *Elnashra*. URL: <https://www.elnashra.com/news/show/118521/> (accessed 01.09.2020).
- Journal of Strategic Studies*. 2015. 38.5. Pp. 626–649. Published online: 04.08.2015. <https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fjss20/38/5?nav=tocList> (accessed 01.09.2020).
- Leader in Levant Liberation [Committee] to Quds Arabi: We will fight Zenki Movement that wants to eliminate us... *Al-Quds al-Arabi (UK)*. 23.02.18. URL: <https://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=88547/> (accessed 01.09.2020).
- Lister C., Nelson D. All the President's Militias: Assad's Militiafication of Syria. *Middle East Institute*. 14.12.2017. URL: <http://www.mei.edu/content/article/all-president-s-militias-assad-s-militiafication-syria> (дата обращения: 27.03.2018).
- Lund A. Showdown in East Ghouta. *Carnegie Middle East Center*. 04.08.2016. URL: <http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/63512?lang=en> (accessed 01.09.2020).
- Lund A. Struggling to Adapt: The Muslim Brotherhood in a New Syria. *Carnegie Endowment*. URL: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Brief_Lund-Syrian_MB.pdf (accessed 01.09.2020).
- Mansharof Y. Despite denials by Iranian regime, statements by Majlis member and reports in Iran indicate involvement of Iranian troops in Syria fighting. *The Middle East Media Research Institute*. URL: <https://www.memri.org/reports/despite-denials-iranian-regime-statements-majlis-member-and-reports-iran-indicate> (accessed 02.09.2020).
- Political Source to Rai al-Youm: Expected Meeting between Mohammed Alloush, Russian Diplomats. *Rai al-Youm*. URL: <http://www.raialyoum.com/?p=466451> (accessed 01.09.2020).
- Syria Deeply, Analysis: The Fifth Corps and the State of the Syrian Army. *Newsdeeply*. 11.01.2017. URL: <https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/articles/2017/01/11/analysis-the-fifth-corps-and-the-state-of-the-syrian-army> (accessed 01.09.2020).