

THE ROLE OF THE INSURGENT STATES IN KURDISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT

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This paper studies the phenomenon of the insurgent states (IS) and possibilities for extrapolation of this political paradigm on the Kurdish national movement. Author states that an IS is highly unlikely to emerge as a result of a social, stadial, dialectical, and political development. The insurgent state is a political phenomenon, first of all is a result of some traumatic affairs: civil war, intervention, revolution, coup d'Etat, collapse of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia etc. Each IS manifests crisis in the principles of the statehood, fragmentation of political space, which may also be provoked by internal reasons. The author argues that the Kingdom of Kurdistan (1919-1924) led by Mahmoud Barzanji and his rebels, was a typical insurgent state fighting with Ottoman Empire on its dusk and British colonial rule lately, and its insurgent tradition politically has become extrapolated upon recent insurgences in Kurdistan including Ararat Republic (1930), Dersim rebellion in Turkey (1937-1938) and the September uprising led by Moustafa Barzani in Iraq since 1961.

Keywords: Kurdistan, insurgent state, insurgents, Kurdish national movement

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РОЛЬ ПОВСТАНЧЕСКИХ ГОСУДАРСТВ В КУРДСКОМ НАЦИОНАЛЬНОМ ДВИЖЕНИИ

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В данном докладе, представленном на английском языке, изучается феномен повстанческих государств (ПГ) и возможная экстраполяция их политического опыта на курдское национальное движение. Автор утверждает, что ПГ никогда не возникает в результате социально-стадиального диалектического, политического развития. Повстанческое государство — это политический феномен, прежде всего возникающий в результате травмирующих событий: гражданской войны, интервенции, революции, государственного переворота, распада Советского Союза, Югославии и т. д. Каждое ПГ проявляется в кризисе принципов государственности, является результатом фрагментации политического пространства, которая может быть спровоцирована и внутренними причинами. Автор утверждает, что Королевство Курдистан (1919–1924), созданное Махмудом Барзанджи и его повстанцами, было типичным повстанческим государством, воевавшим с Османской

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империей на ее закате и британским колониальным правлением в последующие дни, а его повстанческая традиция может быть экстраполирована на последовавшие повстанческие движения в Курдистане, включая Араратскую Республику (1927–1931), Дерсимское восстание в Турции (1937–1938) и сентябрьское восстание под руководством Мустафы Барзани в Ираке с 1961 по 1975 г.

Ключевые слова: Курдистан, повстанческое государство, повстанцы, курдское национальное движение

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In my presentation, I would like to pay specific attention to what is called an insurgent state (IS) in modern Politology. I think it is useful to analyze and discuss how this definition may be extrapolated on the history of the Kurdish insurgency at least since the end of the WWI.

First of all, there are certain misunderstandings in terms of the Insurgent State in Russian, English, Turkish (*isyancı devlet*) and Kurdish (*dewleta serbîlder*) languages. In English both *insurgent states* or *rebellion states* refer to the same forms of proto-state formations, while the Russian literature identifies them as “a type of quasi-state formed as a result of an incidental actual secession” [Popov, 2012, 76] or the “territories under the full control of the opponents of the central government in the country (i. e., rebels)” [Turovsky, 2016]. This does not fully embrace all their specifics, which currently has a very significant research background especially in a light of the example of Kurdish insurgency.

The international community often mislabels a country that faces insurgent, secessionist movement or rebellion and governs itself without national sovereignty over its territory (or any part of it) as a failed state. This misdiagnosis is the result of a single viewed interpretation of the essence of political science, which advocates centralized, comprehensive governments as the norm instead of historical exceptions. This concept of “idealized state” leads policymakers to prioritize and resort to a military response, such as that has resulted in the war in Ukraine since 2014 when typical insurgences, namely Donetsk and Lugansk, self-proclaimed republics, have provoked Russian military intervention in 2022, which have let to actual secession of Russian speaking regions of Ukraine. On the other hand, pragmatic thinking about reunification of the periphery (rebels) and the center would have yielded more useful opportunities for preventing such military conflicts.

Insurgent state may built itself on existing informal institutions: economic, governance, and judicial, for example in order to increase security and stability to let the people to follow it. These priorities may lead to a stable mix of both centralized and decentralized decision-making power: what may be called mediated [Ucko, 2022] or aggregated states [Bogaturov, Vinogradov, 2002].

In English literature the concept of IS was developed by American geographer D. McColl (“Insurgent State”, 1969). The key concept of studying IS is the rebels’ control over the territory or what is called a territorial imperative, which bears definition of a statehood by means of creation of insurgent bases in the country. This concept was influenced by the Mao Zedong’s view on the revolutionary insurgency, that resulted in creation of the Peoples Republic of China (except Taiwan) in 1949 and for some period, the Communist China has become the iconic accomplished insurgent state till 1976 when it was officially recognized and seated in UN. Considering these definitions, we can see an unstoppable list of IS’s in the world now, that correspond to this definition which have emerged over the complete insurgent’s territorial control with a support of relatively loyal locals, local elites, and formation of their own self-defense structures (or national liberation movements) by means of insurgency, that may also be enforced by territorial police, armed forces, self-defense and self-government bodies, tax collection, formation of a parallel economy etc. (let us call them the IS of second level).

In this way, it is necessary to mention that the former leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and former Iraqi president Jلال Talabani and the leader of PKK Abdullah Ocalan were aware of Maoist theory of the stadial insurgent war, and have read Mao Zedong's books [Talabani, 2018]. The theory of the "Socialist Kurdistan" as it was developed in works written by Ocalan in the 1970s had very many tactical and strategic features of Maoist approaches to the insurgency [Ocalan, 1998].

This pattern was also characteristic of the "Era of insurgency" of the 1940–1960s. Since then, modern national revolutions have adopted the creation of a territorially based "anti-state" as their primary tactic (IS) within a state. This mechanism represents the creation of territorial units with all the attributes of any legitimate state, control over territory and population and, in particular, the creation of its own main regions and administrative units. In fact, it is useful to view modern national revolutions as a process of evolution of a territorially determined political unit in a politically hostile territory [McCull, 1969, p. 619].

The source of emerging of any insurgent state is a rebellion, revolt; IS cannot emerge because of a social stadial dialectical development. The insurgent state is a political phenomenon, first of all is a result of some traumatic affairs: civil war, intervention, revolution, coup d'état, collapse of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia etc. Each IS manifests crisis in the principles of the statehood, fragmentation of political space, which may also be provoked by internal reasons. In a purely legal sense, the formal rule of law of the state does not extend to areas of rebel control and a rebellion state exists due to the legal principle "ex facto jus oritur" [Mampilly, 2011, p. 40].

The emergence of insurgency can be traced worldwide and guerrilla and insurgent movements have fought foreign occupation forces throughout history. During the Napoleon wars in Spain in 1812 (which is referred to as the Peninsular War in British literature since then) Britain provided aid to the Spanish guerrillas, tying down tens of thousands of French troops. Encouraged by the spontaneous mass resistance against Napoleon in Spain, the British backed the guerrillas because it cost them much less than equipping British soldiers to face the French in conventional warfare. The Peninsular War was one of the most successful partisan wars in history and was where the Spanish term "guerrilla" was first used in its modern context in English. The rebels in Sudan (1881–1898) under the leadership of Muhammad Ahmad bin Abdullah bin Fahal who claimed to be a Makhdi, the Afrikaner Republics in the Second Boer War from 1899 to 1902 in South Africa — all employed guerrilla tactics with de-facto creating insurgent state and extensively after being defeated by British Army. After the military failure of the Easter Rising in 1916, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) also resorted to guerrilla tactics during the Irish War of Independence from 1919 to 1921. These conflicts document the presence of insurgencies throughout the history of warfare.

Better known as guerrilla warfare during the 19th and early 20th century, insurgency was employed by indigenous groups from defeated armies in opposition to foreign or colonial occupation.

As we will see below, the emergence of such rebel states was facilitated by the unsettled territorial separation of cultural, ethnic and religious identities, which led to uprisings under various slogans. Thus, the Kingdom of Kurdistan had the characteristics of a rebel state, the original source of which was a rebellion against Ottoman rule, however, as we will see, since 1919, the British occupational authorities has become Mahmoud Barzanji's main antagonist.

Nevertheless, many researches consider IS existing since WWII [McCull, 1969, Jones, 2016]. However, it is important to examine this phenomenon from the point of the insurgents. Such approach was developed in Seth Jones' "Waging Insurgent Warfare: From Vietcong to Islamic State" studying irregular warfare from the insurgents' perspective since the end of WWII. This work correlates different characteristics of insurgencies with their outcomes [Jones, 2016]. It brings to conclusion that in terms of Kurdish

national movement it is desirable to know how insurgents are adapting in response to current trends to catch a fundamental change in the security environment.

Emergence of insurgent states shows a crisis of the Westphalian system that has at least 300 years history. The Westphalian system established territorial control as a source of national sovereignty. But further emergence of national liberation movements worldwide has established the modern terms of the national sovereignty (when the people is the source of the power). As history shows, once a state is recognized by international community as an independent state (Uruguay in 1825) or gains its official status within the jurisdiction of the parent state (Iraqi Kurdistan in 2005), it loses its identity as an IS. Also Palestine is not an IS as it is officially recognized by UN.

All insurgent states are illegal in terms of jurisdiction of the parent state; they either exist in a form of armed conflict with it, or just struggle for the loyalty of citizens on their territory at the same time. One of the most important indicators of the viability of such rebel regimes are its claims to independence and external legitimacy. Insurgents seek to create a compelling narrative — the story of a party to an armed struggle is used to justify its actions in order to attain legitimacy and favor among relevant populations.

“The Era of Insurgency” in the 40–60s featured insurgent movements mostly of anti-imperialistic nature when territorially based insurgents were fighting against foreign intervention. But from the very beginning of the September uprising, 1961, led by Mustafa Barzani, many insurgent/separatist movements in the 1970s, 80s and mostly 90s after the collapse of the Soviet Union, were primarily based on ethnic or confessional particularism [Vanly, 1965].

IS’s may be divided into two main types: secessionist and expansionist movements. Expansionists are divided into national (Chinese Revolution since 1927, Sendero Luminoso in Peru etc.) and transnational (ISIS, banned in the Russian Federation). Their goals are not only to replace the current leadership of the state, but also is a fundamental change in the form of the government, and often in the structure of the society itself.

In the formation of a rebel/insurgent state, the most important role is played by the geographical aspect of its evolution, as well as the definition of the goals of such insurgent movement. There is a certain definite difference between separatist uprisings, revolutions and national revolutions, caliphate or jihadist movements (i. e. Northern-Caucasian Emirate, 1827–1859, led by Gazi Muhammed and Shamil)

Nowadays this term (IS) may be referred to the Gaza Stripe under the rule of the HAMAS quazi-parliamentary system, Rojava (AANES) in Syria, Iraqi Kurdistan until 2005, Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics in Ukraine (2014–2022), Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (1991–2000), M23 in DRC, Chiampas in Mexico, Puntland and Somaliland in Somalia, etc.

According to American researcher D. Ucko, direct military confrontation with a state is becoming less attractive to would-be insurgents due to three significant changes in the post-Cold War international security environment. First, urbanization is accelerating, making it easier for states to control their populations, including insurgents. Now the states strengthened their internal security tools, including digital surveillance while citizens granted their governments broader legal authorities to combat terrorism at home and abroad. Second, much of the international community looked positively on anticolonial and national liberation movements during the post–World War II, but today, states are far less tolerant of regional instability created by violent insurgencies. Finally, and most importantly, while regional powers continue to meddle in their neighbors’ affairs by sponsoring insurgents, superpowers are less likely to offer them military support [Ucko, 2022].

The declining of state-sponsored insurgencies in the first two decades of the twenty-first century indicates a structural change in the international security environment. This is an intensified security contest between the United States, Russia, and China. As these superpowers attempt to avoid clashing

directly while managing nuclear escalation, supporting insurgencies may become even more attractive in the future, not less. Regardless, not every insurgent group will have a powerful state patronage within it.

In studying examples of post–Cold War insurgencies, some successful and others not, Ucko identifies three strategies: *localized*, *infiltrative*, and *ideational* insurgencies. Violence plays an essential role in all three of them. However, the modern insurgents' path to victory no longer solely depends upon violently wresting power from the state, more over the goal of this path, victory itself, permanently may remain vague and unreachable.

The first strategy is a localized insurgency in which insurgents carve out a geographic section of the country to control instead of trying to govern the entire state. This include many nationalists movement and insurgent states, including Kingdom of Kurdistan (1919–1924) let by Mahmoud Barzanji and his rebels. In many cases, rural, inaccessible regions, mountains and marginalized urban sectors are ripe for insurgent takeover, and these areas of neglect create conditions for settlement between the insurgents and the government. Thus, we can refer to the Jaysh al-Mahdi militia in Baghdad since 2004, which controlled large areas of the city. The insurgents are always free to renegotiate violently to further weaken the fragile state's institutions and to attract criminal and extremist outsiders.

Tobias Bernard Switzer of Modern War Institute counts that countries with open political systems are vulnerable to a second strategy, the infiltrative insurgency. Instead of overthrowing the state in a violent contest, this type of insurgent subverts the government by accessing legal avenues to power and then turning political institutions against the state. His examples, the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland and the Movimiento al Socialismo party in Bolivia, show that the states with deep social schisms are the most susceptible to the infiltrative insurgent². While the infiltrative insurgent enters politics openly as a political party, it trades in ambiguity to hide its true intention for secession. Infiltrative insurgents separate their militants and political figures, allowing mask their violent actions and even, duplicitously, condemn those acts. Unlike traditional political parties committed to the democratic process, the infiltrative insurgent uses democracy instrumentally. Once elected to power, according to Ucko, insurgents subvert the state's power to neuter counterbalancing institutions and lock in their power indefinitely.

Dealing with an infiltrative insurgent brings us is an excruciating challenge: The state must first unmask the insurgents' true intentions. Then, it must find a way to circumscribe democracy to save it. The state can try to eliminate the insurgent's political party, make it morally repugnant by refusing to deal with it, or make it illegal. Unfortunately, Ucko warns, these are the same tactics repressive regimes use to stifle dissent and maintain power, so states will find it difficult to suppress democratic expression while maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the populace [Ucko, 2022].

This type of insurgency can provide a long-term symbiotic relationship between localized insurgent groups and the state. As an insurgent state, insurgents govern parts of the country abandoned by the national government, which focuses on the concerns of the elites, but gaining local support by development of the social infrastructure in the region, abandoned by the central government. Boko Haram till it was "technically defeated" in 2021 in Nigeria can be explained by ability to "maintain momentum" in part by the accumulated and unaddressed grievances against colonialism in the region, including the colonial boundaries (of Nigeria, Ghana, etc.) established by Europeans that bear no resemblance to pre-colonial empires, ethnic or cultural territories, and by the group's use of the "historical narrative" of the Islamic Kanem–Bornu Empire (926–1846). This comes to the third type of insurgency Ucko identifies as ideational insurgency, and it has less historical precedent. The ubiquity of internet access and the mass migration of social life to online spaces have created structureless, networked insurgencies. Insurgents employing this strategy seize on existing tensions to reshape ideas and perceptions over who and what is

² URL: <https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-changing-face-of-insurgency/> (дата обращения: 06.12.2023).

to blame. By swaying the population to its interpretations of events and sowing doubt about the state and traditional sources of authority, the ideational insurgent erodes norms, changes culture, and influences policy. By becoming ephemeral and leaderless, ideational insurgents deny the state the ability to target individuals leaving only the ideology for it to confront. By sharing information, stories, memes, and other content online that serve the ideology's narrative but fall short of advocating for or directing violence, the insurgents keep the state at bay. Ideational insurgents employ violence by inspiring random followers to commit acts of terrorism and harassment without explicit direction [Ucko, 2022].

In modern Iraq, this is identified by the Kurds as a sectarian conflict: some groups seek the former status quo in which the Sunni minority have exercised power since the Ottoman period. Others are clearly restoration groups drawn from the former regime: the Baa'th Party, the paramilitary Fida'iyn, and the Republican Guard. Other groups are anti-Saddam nationalist groups with no desire to see Saddam restored but who resented the US and Western presence.

Insurgency will also continue to attract non-state actors, as they are not bound by internationally accepted standards of conduct. Insurgents will always seek to redefine the operating environment and create asymmetric conditions by quickly changing the nature of the conflict and employing capabilities, which their stronger military adversaries are least prepared for.

The vast majority of rebel states were extremely short-lived, and could survive due to the sponsorship of a foreign state or international organizations only. During this period, they may "accumulate their internal sovereignty" [McCull, 1969, p. 617]. The lack of information about the goals of the rebels and the degree of control of non-state actors in the territory makes it difficult to use a unified methodology for determining the IS's, depending on the strategy of action, geographical conditions, location of support bases, etc.

Insurgents are using historical, societal, political, or economic conditions that generate discontent among a segment of the population to rally support for their movement. These conditions affect one subgroup disproportionately, include a recent history of internal conflict that has left lingering grievances against the government or other ethnic groups or hostility among groups and that establishes violence as an accepted means of resolving political disputes. Also recent or ongoing conflicts in neighboring states that generate refugees who could become recruits to establish ungoverned spaces in the neighboring countries (like M23³ in DRC) to serve as sanctuaries for insurgents with a perspective transforming into an insurgent state. There may also be such social factors as a strong warrior or conspiratorial culture or a youth bulge (a high proportion of 15 to 25 year-olds relative to the adult population), which can provide a pool of potential recruits. Also inhospitable terrain such as jungles, mountains, forests, deserts, or swamps which allows insurgents to move, hide, train, and organize in areas that are difficult for government forces to enter. Increasingly, dense urban areas meet this need, as well as cross-border sanctuaries of rebellion's enclaves.

Government policies may disadvantage a segment of the population on the basis of religion, tribe, ethnicity, language or region, or class, reinforcing insurgent efforts to foster a group identity. Also a polarized "winner-takes-all" political system, which generates grievances among out-groups and undermines the potential for cooperation in pursuit of common agendas. Such a system often creates government paralysis in the face of a crisis because competing parties are unable to reach consensus. The emergence of insurgent states may be incepted by an inability of the government to provide basic services, such as security, justice, health care, education, utilities, or transportation infrastructure. Sometimes insurgent states provide such services in such fields as health care, where the central government has disadvantage (Boko Haram in Nigeria). It may be incepted by corrupt security forces, especially the police, because they

³ Insurgent movement of Rwandese origin in Democratic Republic of Congo.

interact most frequently with the people. An economic crisis or extended period of poor economic conditions that generates discontent with the government and provides a base of unemployed or underemployed youth ripe for recruitment. A “window of vulnerability”, created by events such as natural disasters, political assassinations, coup d'état, hotly disputed elections, acts of vandalism, terrorism or genocide.

An attempt to analyze the Kurdish national movement from the point of view of approaches and characteristics of a ISs makes sense if we to consider them appearing immediately after the end of the World War I, which was a clear indicator of the crisis and a certain insolvency of the then established new Versailles international legal system, which did not take into consideration the rights of the Kurds to self-determination, despite that the principle of the right of nations to self-determination was fundamental for this system. Since the time of the Treaty of Versailles, the primary actors on the world stage have been sovereign states, whose territoriality has been and remains one of their main features. At the same time, the sovereignty and territoriality of states have been repeatedly questioned, which has led to their fragmentation.

As for the Kurdish reality, the basic differences between state and tribe makes us conclude that the two systems seem fundamentally incompatible, their relations at best only temporarily symbiotic. States are static, intent on exercising a monopoly of power within a defined territory.. Tribes operate on kinship ideology and territoriality. The latter includes not only established villages but more fluid ideas that no state could entertain [McDowall, 2020, p. 16].

The fundamental reason, however, why states and tribes are incompatible lies with the whole reason for tribal hierarchy. Beyond the tribal group, the chief acts as mediator either with his peers and the paramount chief, or with the state. A chief jealously guards his monopoly of all relations with the outside world, including leadership if it comes to war.

If a state exercises a monopoly of power, its authority regarding taxation and the administration of justice will extend to every individual within its territory, rendering the mediation of a tribal chief with the outside world and thus the *raison d'être* of tribal existence meaningless.

Since 1918 that states abutting the Kurds have crushed and eroded the kinship ideology of the tribes [McDowall, 2020, p.16]. Secondly, due to the WWI processes the territory of Kurdistan has become more ethnically homogenic [Лазарев, 1964, с. 6–7]. The first Kurdish rebel state can be considered as Kingdom of Kurdistan, and with its broad social support in Sulaimani and had some similarities with the Hijaz, another insurgent state appeared as a result of the WWI. Thus, the Kingdom of Kurdistan, which was initially created as a puppet state by the British occupation authorities, but resulted out in the rebellion against the British rule in May 1919, briefly became a short-lived IS.

The uprising of Sheikh Said in Turkey in 1925 did not lead to the emergence of IS for the reason that the rebel tribes did not establish their own military bases that were difficult for the enemy to reach. Therefore, the uprising was also relatively easily suppressed using aviation by Britain and Turkey.

The Ararat Republic of 1927–1931 was one example of an entity initially conceived as a Kurdish IS (*Komara Agiriyê*) with a network of bases on Mount Ararat, including the support of the Armenians units. But it was military liquidated by Turkey due mostly to the lack of an external support.

The Dersim uprising against Turkey's assimilation policy also did not lead to the emergence of a IS with its own functions, since it was extremely brutally suppressed by the Kemalist government. Meanwhile, the experience of Dersim is the one relatively inaccessible to the central authorities, whose inhabitants, being ethnically and religiously isolated, participated in a series of uprisings in order to protect their desire to live according to their own laws. Thus, in the mid-30s, the leader of this uprising, Seyit Riza, considered Dersim to be the original Kurdish territory and, during the period of Turkey's suppression of the rebellion, he actively sought support in the international arena under the banner of Kurdish self-determination.

It is also quite difficult to consider the Mehabad Republic in Iran in 1946 as a rebel state, since its origin was not an uprising. It arose as a result of the political vacuum that formed here after the Soviet-British occupation of 1943, when Mukrin Kurdistan found itself in a neutral zone between the Soviet and British occupation zones.

The model insurgent state in the history of the Kurdish national movement is Iraqi Kurdistan from the beginning of the uprising in 1961 until 2005, when its autonomous status was formalized in the constitution. Meanwhile, the assertion that the formalization of the status of a PG within the parent state leads to getting rid of the characteristics of a PG is also controversial. This can be seen in the example of the same EC, which has unresolved territorial disputes with the central government in Baghdad.

The Socialist Kurdistan, which was conceived in the works of Öcalan and party documents of the PKK, banned in Turkey, as a typical rebel state, was largely seen as a nationwide Kurdish project with ultra-leftist specifics, including those based on Mao Zedong's theory of the staged nature of guerrilla armed struggle. Subsequently, Öcalan's theoretical approaches underwent revision, and in a series of his so-called prison writings, he developed the concept of "democratic confederalism", which is opposed to the concept of statehood in general. This did not deny the essence of the emerging Kurdish rebel state, which began to take shape in Turkey as a result of victories in municipal elections in a number of Kurdish regions by Öcalan's ideological supporters represented by the Democratic Community Party in 2010, whose supporters essentially began to form local government structures parallel to the state ones within an umbrella structure controlled by the Go K. Now many of them have been arrested and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, just like Salahattin Demirtas, leader of the People's Democracy Party (Turkey), who came to us here at the institute. The most significant project of the Kurdish rebel state is Rojava (AANES).

As there remain few geographically remote areas outside government control where insurgencies can gestate, the initial stages of development tend to take place hidden in plain sight: in cities and other developed areas. The ongoing global trend towards urbanization means that future insurgencies will tend to form and develop in cities rather than rural areas. Urban regions are likely to be the insurgent secessionist area if the conflict brings them to identify themselves as secessionists based on shared common set of values (Donetsk and Lugansk republics in Ukraine (2014–2022)). While this is necessary for survival, this dispersion will make it difficult for insurgent movements to concentrate enough power to seize control of a state. Beckett notes that the "Maoist People's War" was effective because it was able to weaken the regime psychologically and politically, and then launch decisive military blows. Modern insurgents may never be able to develop enough military power to undertake conventional operations and thus have to rely more on psychological and political means. Widely dispersed, networked insurgencies are difficult to eradicate, but also less likely to gain victory than the more concentrated insurgencies prior to and during the 20th century.

Any IS undergoes a test of the quality of its statehood. As historical practice has shown, none of the previous Kurdish "rebel states" passed it. The "quality" of statehood is determined mainly by general criteria (the strength of national identity, the level of support for the ruling regime, the stability of the economic base, the advantageous geographical location). [Колосов, Себенцов, Туров, 2021, p. 29]. A special criterion for the effectiveness of institutions of the rebels is the ability to retain the population in such a state, providing them with jobs, a decent level of income and public services, and most importantly, ensuring their security. IS, like any other unrecognized states, compete for the loyalty of citizens primarily with the "mother" state, and the welfare of the citizens of its citizens in comparison with the rest of the country is one of the most important indicators of the viability of their political regimes and a criterion for assessing claims to independence and external legitimacy.

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